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Abstract
The recent square root law (SRL) for covert communication demonstrates that Alice can reliably
transmit O(√n) bits to Bob in n uses of an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel while
keeping ineffective any detector employed by the adversary; conversely, exceeding this limit either
results in detection by the adversary with high probability or non-zero decoding error probability at
Bob. This SRL is under the assumption that the adversary knows when Alice transmits (if she transmits);
however, in many operational scenarios he does not know this. Hence, here we study the impact of the
adversary’s ignorance of the time of the communication attempt. We employ a slotted AWGN channel
model with T (n) slots each containing n symbol periods, where Alice may use a single slot out of
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2T (n). Provided that Alice’s slot selection is secret, the adversary needs to monitor all T (n) slots for
possible transmission. We show that this allows Alice to reliably transmit O(min{√n log T (n), n})
bits to Bob (but no more) while keeping the adversary’s detector ineffective. To achieve this gain over
SRL, Bob does not have to know the time of transmission provided T (n) < 2cTn, cT = O(1).
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent revelations of massive surveillance programs [2] have emphasized the need for secure
communication systems that do not just protect the content of the user’s message from being
decoded, but prevent the detection of its transmission in the first place. Indeed, encrypted
data or even just the transmission of a signal can arouse suspicion, and even the most the-
oretically robust cryptographic security scheme can be defeated by a determined adversary
using non-computational methods such as side-channel analysis. Covert, or low probability of
detection/intercept (LPD/LPI) communication capability is thus very important in extremely
sensitive situations (e.g., during military operations or for organization of civil unrest).
In the covert communication scenario, Alice transmits a message to Bob over a noisy channel
while the adversary, warden Willie, attempts to detect her transmission. The channel from Alice
to Willie is also subject to noise. Thus, while Alice transmits low-power covert signals to Bob,
Willie attempts to classify these signals as either noise on his channel or signals from Alice. We
recently showed that the square root law (SRL) governs covert communication: provided that
Alice and Bob pre-share a secret of sufficient length, she can reliably transmit O(√n) bits to
Bob in n uses of an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel while keeping ineffective
any detector employed by Willie. Conversely, attempting to transmit more that O(√n) bits either
results in detection by Willie with probability one or non-zero decoding error probability at Bob
as n→∞ [3], [4]. Follow-on work has addressed the size of the pre-shared secret [5], [6], the
optimal constant hidden by the asymptotic (big-O) notation [6], [7], network aspects of covert
communication [8], [9], extensions of the SRL to quantum channels where the adversary is only
limited by the laws of quantum mechanics [10]–[12], and, finally, practical limitations on the
3adversary that improve the covert throughput to beyond the SRL limit [13]–[17].
Studies of covert communication up to now assume that Willie knows when Alice may
start to transmit (if she does). However, in many practical scenarios (e.g., delay-constrained
communication), Alice’s message may have to be short relative to the total time available
to transmit it (e.g., a few seconds out of the day when both Alice and Bob are available).
Additionally, Willie might not know when the communication starts (e.g., a possible transmission
time can be secretly pre-arranged in advance). This forces Willie to monitor a much longer time
period than the duration of Alice’s transmission, limiting his capabilities. Here we show how
Alice can leverage Willie’s ignorance of her transmission time to transmit significant additional
information covertly to Bob.
slot 1
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
slot 2
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · · slot tA
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
· · · slot T (n)
n︷ ︸︸ ︷
︸ ︷︷ ︸
nT (n) total symbol periods


Slot used by Alice and Bob
Fig. 1: Slotted channel: each of the T (n) slots contains n symbol periods. Alice and Bob use
slot tA to communicate.
In our scenario, Alice communicates to Bob over an AWGN channel. Willie also has an
AWGN channel from Alice. Unlike the setting in [3], [4], the channel is slotted, as shown
in Figure 1. Each of T (n) slots contains n symbol periods, where T (n) is an increasing
function of n. If Alice used all nT (n) symbol periods for transmission, then, by the SRL
in [3], [4], she could reliably transmit O(√nT (n)) covert bits to Bob. However, to model a
practical scenario where Alice is constrained to a short message relative to the total available
transmission time, her communication is restricted to a single slot tA which is kept secret
from Willie. While this certainly reduces the amount of transmissible data, a natural question
is whether an improvement can be made over a naı¨ve application of the SRL [3], [4], which
allows Alice to reliably transmit O(√n) covert bits in this scenario. Here we demonstrate that
4Alice can transmit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n}) bits reliably on this channel while maintaining
arbitrarily low probability of detection by Willie. Conversely, we show that the transmission of
ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits1 either results in Alice being detected with high probability or unreliable
communication.
The improvement stems from Willie not knowing tA and being forced to monitor all T (n)
slots. When Willie knows which slot Alice might use, by Theorem 2 in [3], [4] she can be
detected if she transmits more than O(√n) bits, since it is improbable that Willie’s observations
will look like AWGN noise that he expects. His optimal detector is a threshold on the power
observed in slot tA [17]. However, if Willie does not know tA, he has to examine all T (n) slots.
Effectively, Willie’s test statistic is the maximum slot power (see the remark following the proof
of Theorem 1.1). When only noise is observed, the average maximum slot power is substantially
higher than average power in any single slot. Hence, to avoid false alarms, Willie’s threshold
when he does not know tA must also be greater than when he knows it. This allows Alice to
transmit additional covert information.
Our main result is stated formally as follows:
Theorem. Suppose the channel between Alice and each of Bob and Willie experiences indepen-
dent additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) with constant power σ2b > 0 and σ
2
w > 0, respec-
tively, and that Alice’s transmitter is subject to the average power constraint Pmax ∈ (0,∞).
Also suppose that, if Alice chooses to transmit, she uses one of the T (n) slots chosen randomly.
Each slot contains n symbol periods, where T (n) = ω(1). Then, for any  > 0, Alice can
reliably transmit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n}) bits to Bob in a selected slot while maintaining
a probability of detection error by Willie greater than 1
2
− . Conversely, if Alice tries to
1Throughout this paper we employ asymptotic notation [18, Ch. 3.1] where f(n) = O(g(n)) denotes an asymptotic upper
bound on f(n) (i.e., there exist constants m,n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ f(n) ≤ mg(n) for all n ≥ n0), f(n) = o(g(n)) denotes
an upper bound on f(n) that is not asymptotically tight (i.e., for any constant m > 0, there exists constant n0 > 0 such that
0 ≤ f(n) < mg(n) for all n ≥ n0), and f(n) = ω(g(n)) denotes a lower bound on f(n) that is not asymptotically tight (i.e.,
for any constant m > 0, there exists constant n0 > 0 such that 0 ≤ mg(n) < f(n) for all n ≥ n0).
5transmit ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits using n consecutive symbol periods, either Willie detects her
with arbitrarily low probability of error or Bob cannot decode her message with arbitrary low
probability of decoding error as n→∞.
As in [3], [4], covert communication requires that Alice and Bob possess a common random-
ness resource. This corresponds to a secret codebook2 needed in our proofs that is shared between
Alice and Bob prior to communication, analogous to the one-time pad in the information-
theoretic analysis of encryption [20]. This follows “best practices” in security system design
as the security of the covert communication system depends only on the shared secret [21].
Remarkably, we demonstrate that the multiplicative increase (by a factor of
√
log T (n)) in the
number of covert bits that Alice can transmit reliably to Bob does not require Bob to know the
timing of the transmission if T (n) < 2cTn, where cT > 0 is a constant; to realize the
√
log T (n)
gain when T (n) ≥ 2cTn only an additive expense of an extra log T (n) secret bits is needed to
indicate to Bob the slot employed by Alice. Thus, at most log T (n) secret bits are required in
excess of those needed to enable the SRL on a single n-symbol slot. Timing is therefore a very
useful resource for covert communication. It also necessitates a vastly different analysis than
that in [3], [4]. Specifically, the relative entropy based bounds on the probability of detection
error used in [3], [4] are too loose to yield our achievability results, and we thus have to apply
other techniques from mathematical statistics.
After introducing our slotted channel model in Section II, we prove the achievability and the
converse in Sections III and IV, respectively. We discuss the relationship of our paper to other
work in covert communication in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
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Fig. 2: System framework: Alice and Bob share a secret before transmission. If Alice chooses
to transmit, she encodes information into a vector of real symbols f = {fi}ni=1 and uses random
slot tA to send it on an AWGN channel to Bob (to ensure reliable decoding tA is secretly shared
with Bob before the transmission if T (n) ≥ 2cTn, where cT is a constant). Upon observing the
channel from Alice, Willie has to classify his vector of readings Yw as either an AWGN vector
Zw = {Z(w)i }nT (n)i=1 or a vector that contains a slot with transmissions corrupted by AWGN.
II. PREREQUISITES
A. Channel Model
We use the discrete-time slotted AWGN channel model with real-valued symbols depicted in
Figures 1 and 2. The channel has T (n) slots, each containing n symbol periods. Alice selects
slot tA uniformly at random prior to transmission. If Alice chooses to transmit, she sends a
vector of n real-valued symbols f = {fi}ni=1 during slot tA. The AWGN on Bob’s channel is
described by an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sequence {Z(b)i }nT (n)i=1 of nT (n)
zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2b (i.e., Z
(b)
i ∼ N (0, σ2b)). Bob receives
Yb = {Yb(t)}T (n)t=1 where Yb(t) = [Y (b)(t−1)n+1, . . . , Y (b)tn ] is a vector of observations collected
during slot t. If Alice transmits during slot tA, Y
(b)
(tA−1)n+i = fi +Z
(b)
(tA−1)n+i. For any slot that is
2The requirement of a pre-shared secret was shown to be unnecessary [5], [6] for the standard SRL in [3], [4] if Bob has a
better channel than Willie; [6] was extended [19] to the asynchronous scenario described in this paper while it was in review.
7not used for transmission, Y (b)(t−1)n+i = Z
(b)
(t−1)n+i (this includes all slots {t : t 6= tA}, and slot tA
when Alice does not transmit).
Similarly, Willie observes Yw = {Yw(t)}T (n)t=1 where Yw(t) = [Y (w)(t−1)n+1, . . . , Y (w)tn ] is a vector
of observations collected during slot t. The AWGN on Willie’s channel is described by an
i.i.d. sequence {Z(w)i }nT (n)i=1 of nT (n) zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variance σ2w
(i.e., Z(w)i ∼ N (0, σ2w)). If Alice transmits during slot tA, Y (w)(tA−1)n+i = fi + Z
(w)
(tA−1)n+i. For
any slot that is not used for transmission, Y (w)(t−1)n+i = Z
(w)
(t−1)n+i (again, this includes all slots
{t : t 6= tA}, and slot tA when Alice does not transmit). Willie does not know tA and has to
perform a statistical hypothesis test on his entire set of observations Yw to determine whether
Alice is transmitting.
B. Hypothesis Testing
Willie performs a statistical hypothesis test [22] on Yw, where the null hypothesis H0 is that
Alice does not transmit and each sample is an i.i.d. realization of AWGN Y (w)i ∼ N (0, σ2w).
The alternate hypothesis H1 is that Alice transmits, and the samples from one of the slots
come from a different distribution. The rejection of H0 when it is true is a false alarm (FA)
and the acceptance of H0 when it is false is a missed detection (MD). The lower bound on
the sum of the probabilities of these events PFA + PMD characterizes the necessary trade-off
between the false alarms and missed detections in a hypothesis test. As in [3], [4], Alice desires
PFA + PMD ≥ 1 −  for an arbitrary choice of  > 0, ensuring that any hypothesis test Willie
constructs is ineffective.3
3Willie’s probability of error is P(w)e = pi0PFA + pi1PMD, where pi0 and pi1 are the prior probabilities of hypotheses H0 and
H1. A random guess of Alice’s transmission state and “uninformative” priors pi0 = pi1 = 12 yield P
(w)
e =
1
2
. By lower-bounding
PFA + PMD ≥ 1− , Alice ensures that, for uninformative priors, any detector Willie employs can only be slightly better than
a random guess. Our scaling results apply when pi0 6= pi1 as well, since P(w)e ≥ min(pi0, pi1) (PFA + PMD).
8III. ACHIEVABILITY
A. Proof Idea and Preliminaries
We proved the achievability theorems in [3], [4] by upper-bounding the relative entropy [23,
Ch. 10] between the distributions of Willie’s sequence of observations Yw corresponding to
hypotheses H0 and H1. Here we take a different approach by explicitly analyzing Willie’s
optimal detector assuming that his only unknowns are:
a) slot tA chosen uniformly at random from {1, . . . , T (n)} by Alice for transmission (if she
transmits), as depicted in Figures 1 and 2; and
b) a secret shared between Alice and Bob prior to the potential transmission.
Thus, Willie is given Alice’s channel input distribution, the distribution of the AWGN on his
channel from Alice, and the slot boundaries depicted in Figure 1. This effectively provides Willie
with a complete statistical model of observations Yw, allowing him to construct the likelihood
functions f0(Yw) and f1(Yw) under hypotheses H0 and H1, respectively. Alice’s transmission
state is binary (either she transmits or she does not) and the optimal detector for Willie is the
likelihood ratio test (LRT) by the Neyman–Pearson lemma [22, Ch. 3.2 and 13.1]. Here we
determine what it takes for Alice to ensure that Willie’s optimal detector performs only slightly
better than a random guess of her transmission state, and how much data she can reliably transmit
to Bob in this manner.
The LRT compares the likelihood ratio Λ(Yw) =
f1(Yw)
f0(Yw)
to a threshold τ(n). H0 or H1 is
chosen based on whether Λ(Yw) is smaller or larger than τ(n) (if it equals the threshold, a
random decision is made):
Λ(Yw)
H0
≶
H1
τ(n). (1)
The LRT statistic Λ(Yw) is a function of the sequence of observations Yw, and, as such, is a
random variable. Per its definition in Section II, Yw is parameterized by the slot length n and
which hypothesis is true (that is, Alice’s transmission state). Let Λ(n)s ≡ Λ(Yw) where s ∈ {0, 1}
9indicates the true hypothesis (H0 or H1). Since one-to-one transformations of both sides in (1)
do not affect the performance of the test, we analyze a detector that is equivalent to the one
defined in (1) but employs the test statistic L(n)s ≡ gn
(
Λ
(n)
s
)
, where gn(x) is a one-to-one
function defined later. Denote by K(n) P−→ Q and K(n) D−→ Q convergence of random variable
K(n) to random variable Q in probability and in distribution, respectively. The following lemma
establishes sufficient conditions for the covertness of Alice’s transmission:
Lemma 1. If the LRT statistic is described by random variables:
L
(n)
0 = S
(n) + V
(n)
0 when H0 is true (2)
L
(n)
1 = S
(n) + V
(n)
1 when H1 is true, (3)
where V (n)0
P−→ 0 and V (n)1 P−→ 0, as well as S(n) D−→ Z with Z ∼ N (0, 1), then PFA +PMD ≥ 1−
for any  > 0 and a sufficiently large n.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In order to employ Lemma 1, we require a one-to-one function gn(x) that re-scales Λ
(n)
s so that
the convergence conditions hold. In the proofs that follow, we show that Λ(n)s = 1T (n)
∑T (n)
t=1 U
(n)
t ,
where {U (n)t }T (n)t=1 is a sequence of T (n) independent random variables, each corresponding to a
slot of length n. Since Alice is limited to slot tA for a potential transmission, the only random
variable in {U (n)t }T (n)t=1 that is distributed differently under each hypothesis is U (n)tA . We thus denote
by U (n,0)tA and U
(n,1)
tA
the random variable corresponding to slot tA under H0 and H1, respectively.
Regardless of Alice’s transmission state, {U (n)t }T (n)t=1
t 6=tA
is an i.i.d. sequence, with U (n,0)tA distributed
identically to the elements of {U (n)t }T (n)t=1
t6=tA
. Therefore,
Λ(n)s =
1
T (n)
T (n)∑
t=1
t 6=tA
U
(n)
t +
U
(n,s)
tA
T (n)
, s ∈ {0, 1}. (4)
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Let’s denote by µU(n) and σ2U(n) respectively the mean and variance of U
(n,0)
tA
and U (n)t , t 6= tA.
We define gn(x) as:
gn(x) =
(x− (T (n)− 1)µU(n))T (n)
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1 . (5)
Thus, the re-scaled test statistic L(n)s is expressed as follows:
L
(n)
0 =
1√
T (n)− 1
T (n)∑
t=1
t6=tA
U
(n)
t − µU(n)
σU(n)
+
U
(n,0)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1 (6)
when H0 is true, and
L
(n)
1 =
1√
T (n)− 1
T (n)∑
t=1
t6=tA
U
(n)
t − µU(n)
σU(n)
+
U
(n,1)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1 (7)
when H1 is true. Provided U
(n)
t satisfies the regularity conditions required by the central limit
theorem (CLT) for triangular arrays [24, Theorem 27.2], 1√
T (n)−1
∑T (n)
t=1
t6=tA
U
(n)
t −µU(n)
σU(n)
D−→ Z, where
Z ∼ N (0, 1). Thus, the weighted sum in (6) and (7) corresponds to S(n) in Lemma 1. Now
consider the term corresponding to slot tA,
U
(n,s)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)−1 . It effectively offsets Z’s mean away
from zero and its distribution depends on Alice’s transmission state s. Thus, depending on which
hypothesis is true, it maps to either V (n)0 or V
(n)
1 in Lemma 1. To prove achievability of covert
communication, we show that there exists a coding scheme for Alice such that the random
variable describing the LRT statistic has the form given in (6) and (7), with the terms in the
sums satisfying the regularity conditions required by the CLT and the term corresponding to
slot tA converging to zero in probability. This allows us to establish the covertness of Alice’s
transmission by applying Lemma 1. We prove reliability by extending the random coding
arguments from [3], [4].
B. Average Power Constraint
We first show achievability under an average power constraint Pmax ∈ (0,∞).
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Theorem 1.1 (Achievability). Suppose Alice has a slotted AWGN channel to Bob with T (n) =
ω(1) slots, each containing n symbol periods, and that her transmitter is subject to the average
power constraint Pmax ∈ (0,∞). Then, provided that Alice and Bob share a sufficiently long
secret, if Alice chooses to, she can transmit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n}) bits in a single slot while
limn→∞ PFA + PMD ≥ 1−  and limn→∞ P(b)e ≤ δ for arbitrary  > 0 and δ > 0.
Proof: Construction: Alice secretly selects slot tA uniformly at random out of the T (n)
slots. Alice’s channel encoder takes as input blocks of length M bits and encodes them into
codewords of length n symbols. We employ a random coding argument and independently
generate 2M codewords {c(Wk), k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M} from Rn for messages {Wk}2Mk=1, each
according to pX(x) =
∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where X ∼ N (0, Pf) and symbol power Pf < σ
2
w
2
is
defined later. The codebook4 is used only to send a single message and, along with tA, is the
secret not revealed to Willie, though he knows how it is constructed, including the value of Pf .
Analysis (Willie): Denote by Υt =
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Y
2
i the power in slot t. Since Willie’s channel
from Alice is corrupted by AWGN with power σ2w, the likelihood function of the observations
Yw under H0 is:
f0(Yw) =
(
1
2piσ2w
)nT (n)
2
exp
− 1
2σ2w
T (n)∑
t=1
Υt
 . (8)
Since Willie does not know which of the T (n) slots Alice randomly selects for communication,
or the codebook Alice and Bob use, but knows that Alice’s signal is Gaussian, the likelihood
function of the observations Yw under H1 is:
f1(Yw) =
1
(2piσ2w)
(T (n)−1)n
2 (2pi(σ2w + Pf))
n
2 T (n)
4Another way of viewing the construction is as a choice of one of T (n) codebooks, where the ith codebook has a block of
non-zero symbols in the ith slot. Selection of the tA-th slot is equivalent to selection of the tA-th codebook and the message is
encoded by choosing a codeword from the selected codebook.
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×
T (n)∑
t=1
exp
− Υt
2(σ2w + Pf)
−
∑T (n)
r=1
r 6=t
Υr
2σ2w
 . (9)
The LRT statistic Λ(n)s is the ratio between (8) and (9). Re-arranging terms yields:
Λ(n)s =
1
T (n)
T (n)∑
t=1
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n
2
exp
[
PfΥt
2σ2w(σ
2
w + Pf)
]
. (10)
When Alice does not transmit in the ith symbol period, Yi ∼ N (0, σ2w) since Willie observes
AWGN; when Alice transmits, Yi ∼ N (0, σ2w + Pf) by construction. Let {Xt}, Xt ∼ χ2n,
t = 1, . . . , T (n) be a sequence of i.i.d. chi-squared random variables with n degrees of freedom.
Then Υt = σ2wXt for all t ∈ {1, . . . , T (n)} under H0 and t ∈ {1, . . . , T (n)} \ {tA} under
H1, while ΥtA = (σ
2
w + Pf)XtA under H1. Let U
(n)
t =
(
σ2w
σ2w+Pf
)n
2
exp
[
PfXt
2(σ2w+Pf)
]
for all t ∈
{1, . . . , T (n)} \ {tA}, U (n,0)tA =
(
σ2w
σ2w+Pf
)n
2
exp
[
PfXt
2(σ2w+Pf)
]
, and U (n,1)tA =
(
σ2w
σ2w+Pf
)n
2
exp
[
PfXt
2σ2w
]
.
Application of gn(x) in (5) to (10) yields the expression for L
(n)
s in the form defined in (6) and
(7).
Using the moment generating function (MGF) Mχ2n(x) = (1 − 2x)−n/2 of a chi-squared
random variable, we have:
µU(n) =
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n
2
E
[
exp
(
PfXt
2(σ2w + Pf)
)]
= 1 (11)
σ2U(n) =
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n
E
[
exp
(
PfXt
σ2w + Pf
)]
− 1 =
(
σ4w
σ4w − P 2f
)n
2
− 1. (12)
Since Pf <
σ2w
2
, µU(n) and σ2U(n) satisfy conditions for the CLT [24, Theorem 27.2],
1√
T (n)−1
∑T (n)
t=1
t 6=tA
U
(n)
t −µU(n)
σU(n)
D−→ Z, where Z ∼ N (0, 1). Also, when Alice does not transmit, by
Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ U
(n,0)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤ σ
2
U(n)
(δσU(n)
√
T (n)− 1− 1)2 .
Since T (n) = ω(1) and Pf <
σ2w
2
,
U
(n,0)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)−1
P−→ 0 as n→∞.
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When Alice transmits,
E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
=
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n
2
E
[
exp
(
PfXt
2σ2w
)]
=
(
σ4w
σ4w − P 2f
)n
2
(13)
E
[(
U
(n,1)
tA
)2]
=
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n
E
[
exp
(
PfXt
σ2w
)]
=
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)n(
σ2w
σ2w − 2Pf
)n
2
. (14)
To complete the analysis of Willie’s detector, we must show
U
(n,1)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)−1
P−→ 0 as n→∞. By
Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ U
(n,1)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
(
δσU(n)
√
T (n)− 1− E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
])2
=
δσU(n)
√
T (n)− 1√
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
] − E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
√
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]

−2
. (15)
Thus, it is sufficient to show that, as long as n→∞ and T (n) = ω(1),
E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]/√
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
→ 0, and (16)
σ2U(n)(T (n)− 1)
/
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
→∞. (17)
We use (12), (13) and (14) to obtain:
E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
√
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
] = 1√(
1 +
P 2f
σ4w(1−2Pf/σ2w)
)n
2 − 1
(18)
σ2U(n)
Var
[
U
(n,1)
tA
] ≥ σ2U(n)
E
[(
U
(n,1)
tA
)2] (19)
=
(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w(1− Pf/σ2w)
)n
2
−
(
σ2w
σ2w + Pf
)−n(
σ2w
σ2w − 2Pf
)−n
2
(20)
14
=
(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w(1− Pf/σ2w)
)n
2
− o(1), (21)
where (21) follows since σ2w > 0 and Pf satisfies 0 ≤ Pf < σ2w/2 by construction.
Now consider two scaling regimes for T (n):
• T (n) = o(en): set Pf =
c
(S)
P σ
2
w
√
log T (n)√
n
with c(S)P > 0 a constant determined later. Taylor
series expansion of log(1 + x) at x = 0 yields:(
1 +
P 2f
σ4w(1− 2Pf/σ2w)
)n
2
= e
n
2
log
(
1+
P2f
σ4w(1−2Pf/σ2w)
)
= e
c
(S)
P
2
log T (n)−o(log T (n)),
implying that (18) converges to zero since T (n) = ω(1). Thus, (16) holds. Furthermore,
Taylor series expansion of log(1− x) at x = 0 shows:(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w(1− Pf/σ2w)
)n
2
= e
n
2
log
(
1− 2P
2
f
σ4w(1−Pf/σ2w)
)
= e−c
(S)
P log T (n)−o(log T (n)),
Thus, there exists c(S)P ∈ (0, 1) such that (17) holds.
• T (n) = Ω(en): set Pf = c
(L)
P σ
2
w/2 with c
(L)
P ∈ (0, 1) a constant. Then, clearly, (16) holds
since (18) converges to zero, and (17) holds for an appropriately chosen c(L)P .
Therefore, setting Pf = σ2w min{ c
(S)
P
√
log T (n)√
n
,
c
(L)
P
2
} ensures convergence of the RHS of (15) to
zero for any scaling of T (n), and, by Lemma 1, ensures PFA + PMD ≥ 1−  for any  > 0.
Analysis (Bob): Let Bob employ the maximum likelihood (ML) decoder (i.e., minimum
distance decoder). If Bob knows the value of tA, Alice can reliably (i.e., with Bob’s decoding
error probability, averaged over all the codebooks, decaying to zero as n→∞) transmit M =
nγ
2
log2
(
1 + σ
2
w
2σ2b
min
{
c
(S)
P
√
log T (n)√
n
,
c
(L)
P
2
})
covert bits, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant [3], [4].
However, knowledge of tA is unnecessary for Bob if T (n) < 2cTn, where cT > 0 is a constant,
as we show next. Let’s augment Alice and Bob’s Gaussian codebook with the origin c(0) =
{0, . . . , 0} (indicating “no transmission”) and have Bob attempt to decode each of the T (n)
slots. The squared distance between a codeword c(Wk) and c(0) is PfX , where X ∼ χ2n.
Repeating the analysis of Bob’s detection error probability from [3], [4] using the distance
between c(Wk) and c(0) instead of c(Wi) yields a looser upper bound on the probability of
15
the decoding error in each slot. By the union bound over all T (n) slots, the overall probability
of error is P(b)e ≤ T (n)2M−
n
2
log2
(
1+
Pf
4σ2
b
)
. If T (n) = o(en), then clearly Bob’s decoding error
probability decays to zero if Alice attempts to transmit M = nγ
2
log2
(
1 +
c
(S)
P σ
2
w
√
log T (n)
4σ2b
√
n
)
bits
in a randomly selected n-symbol slot tA. If T (n) = Ω(en), then, Pf =
c
(L)
P σ
2
w
2
, and T (n) < 2cTn
where cT = 1−γ2 log2
(
1 +
c
(L)
P σ
2
w
8σ2b
)
ensures that Bob’s decoding error probability decays to zero
if Alice attempts to transmit M = nγ
2
log2
(
1 +
c
(L)
P σ
2
w
8σ2b
)
bits in a randomly selected n-symbol
slot tA. Therefore, O(min{
√
n log T (n), n}) covert bits can be transmitted reliably using slot
tA.
Remark: The logarithm of (10) is the log-likelihood ratio:
log Λ(n)s = − log T (n) + u(n) log
T (n)∑
t=1
exp [v(n)Υt]
= − log T (n) + u(n) LogSumExp({v(n)Υt}T (n)t=1 ),
where u(n) ≡
(
σ2w
σ2w+Pf
)n
2
and v(n) ≡ Pf
2σ2w(σ
2
w+Pf)
. Since LogSumExp({xi}) is an analytic
approximation of max({xi}) [25, Ch. 3.1.5], Willie’s (approximate) sufficient statistic is the
maximum slot power Υmax = maxt∈{1,...,T (n)}Υt. While this motivates the design of Willie’s
detector in the converse proof, in the achievability proofs we analyze the exact LRT.
C. Peak Power Constraint
Unfortunately, representing real-valued codewords requires unbounded storage, which means
that the length of the secret pre-shared by Alice and Bob is infinite. To address this, we consider a
finite alphabet, which also satisfies a peak power constraint Pmax ∈ (0,∞) on the transmitter. The
remark in [4, Sec. III] allows both improvement of Bob’s decoding performance and reduction
of the size of the pre-shared secret to O(n) bits (provided T (n) < 2cTn). Approaches reported in
[4], [6], [7] may reduce the pre-shared secret to O(√n log n) bits, and even possibly to O(√n)
bits.
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Theorem 1.2 (Achievability under peak power constraint). Suppose Alice has a slotted AWGN
channel to Bob with T (n) = ω(1) slots, each containing n symbol periods, and that her trans-
mitter is subject to the peak power constraint Pmax ∈ (0,∞). Then, provided that Alice and Bob
share a sufficiently long secret, if Alice chooses to, she can transmit O
(
min{√n log T (n), n})
bits in a single slot while limn→∞ PFA + PMD ≥ 1−  and limn→∞ P(b)e ≤ δ for any  > 0 and
δ > 0.
Proof: Construction: Alice secretly selects slot tA uniformly at random out of the T (n)
slots in which to communicate. She encodes the input in blocks of length M bits into codewords
of length n symbols with the symbols drawn from alphabet {−a, a}, where a satisfies the
peak power constraint a2 < Pmax and is defined later. Alice independently generates 2M
codewords {c(Wk), k = 1, 2, . . . , 2M} for messages {Wk} from {−a, a}n according to pX(x) =∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where pX(−a) = pX(a) = 12 . As in the proof of Theorem 1.1, this single-use
codebook is not revealed to Willie, though he knows how it is constructed, including the value
of a. While in this proof the entire codebook is secretly shared between Alice and Bob, the
amount of shared secret information can be reduced using the remark in [4, Sec. III].
Analysis (Willie): Since the model for the AWGN channel from Alice to Willie is the same
as in Theorem 1.1, the likelihood function of the observations Yw under H0 is given by (8).
Since Willie does not know which of the T (n) slots Alice randomly selects for communication,
or the codebook Alice and Bob use, but knows how the codebook is constructed, the likelihood
function of the observations Yw under H1 is:
f1(Yw) =
1
(2piσ2w)
nT (n)
2 T (n)
T (n)∑
t=1
1
2n
∑
b∈{−1,1}n
e
−
∑T (n)
r=1
r 6=t
Υr+
∑
Yi∈Yw(t)(Yi−abi)
2
2σ2w , (22)
where Υt =
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Y
2
i denotes the power in slot t. The LRT statistic Λ
(n)
s is the ratio between
(8) and (22). Re-arranging terms yields:
Λ(n)s =
1
T (n)
T (n)∑
t=1
exp
[
− na2
2σ2w
]
2n
∑
b∈{−1,1}n
e
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yibi . (23)
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Let U (n)t =
exp
[
− na2
2σ2w
]
2n
∑
b∈{−1,1}n exp
[
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yibi
]
. Application of gn(x) in (5) to (23)
yields the expression for L(n)s in the form defined in (6) and (7).
When Alice does not transmit, exp
[
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yibi
]
∼ logN
(
0, na
2
σ2w
)
, where logN (µ, σ2)
denotes the log-normal distribution with location µ and scale σ2. Thus,
µU(n) =
exp
[
− na2
2σ2w
]
2n
∑
b∈{−1,1}n
E
[
e
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yibi
]
= 1.
To obtain σ2U(n), we calculate the second moment of U
(n,0)
tA
and U (n)t , t 6= tA:
E
[(
U
(n)
t
)2]
=
e
−na2
σ2w
22n
∑
b,d∈{−1,1}n
E
[
e
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yi(bi+di)
]
=
1
22n
∑
b,d∈{−1,1}n
e
a2
σ2w
∑n
i=1 bidi (24)
=
1
22n
∑
b,z∈{−1,1}n
e
a2
σ2w
∑n
i=1 zi (25)
= coshn
(
a2
σ2w
)
, (26)
where (24) follows from exp
[
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yi(bi + di)
]
∼ logN
(
0, a
2
σ2w
∑n
i=1(bi + di)
2
)
; (25) is
since for a given b ∈ {−1, 1}n and any d ∈ {−1, 1}n, z = [b1d1, b2d2, . . . , bndn] ∈ {−1, 1}n is
unique; and (26) follows from Appendix B. Thus, 1√
T (n)−1
∑T (n)
t=1
t6=tA
U
(n)
t −µU(n)
σU(n)
D−→ Z, Z ∼ N (0, 1).
Also, when Alice does not transmit, by Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ U
(n,0)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤ σ
2
U(n)
(δσU(n)
√
T (n)− 1− 1)2 .
Since T (n) = ω(1),
U
(n,0)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)−1
P−→ 0 as n→∞.
When Alice transmits, by construction, Willie observes y(tA−1)n+i ∼ N (aci, σ2w), i = 1, . . . , n,
where c = [c1, . . . , cn] is drawn equiprobably from {−1, 1}n. Thus,
E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
=
e
− na2
2σ2w
22n
∑
c,b∈{−1,1}n
E
[
e
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yibi
]
=
1
22n
∑
c,b∈{−1,1}n
e
a2
σ2w
∑n
i=1 bici = coshn
(
a2
σ2w
)
, (27)
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where (27) follows from exp
[
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yibi
]
∼ logN
(
a2
σ2w
∑n
i=1 cibi,
na2
σ2w
)
, the argument
for (25) above, and Appendix B. By the definition of variance and the law of total expectation,
Var[U
(n,1)
tA
] ≤ 1
2n
∑
c∈{−1,1}n E
[(
U
(n,1)
tA
∣∣∣c sent)2], where
E
[(
U
(n,1)
tA
∣∣∣c sent)2] = e−na2σ2w
22n
∑
b,d∈{−1,1}n
E
[
e
a
σ2w
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Yi(bi+di)
]
=
e
−na2
σ2w
22n
∑
b,d∈{−1,1}n
e
a2
σ2w
∑n
i=1 ci(bi+di)+
(bi+di)
2
2
=
1
22n
∑
b,d∈{−1,1}n
e
a2
σ2w
∑n
i=1 cibi+(ci+bi)di ≤ coshn
(
a2
σ2w
)
coshn
(
2a2
σ2w
)
,
(28)
with (28) following from ci + bi ≤ 2 and arguments for (27) above. By Chebyshev’s inequality:
P
(∣∣∣∣∣ U
(n,1)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ > δ
)
≤
coshn
(
a2
σ2w
)
coshn
(
2a2
σ2w
)
(
δσU(n)
√
T (n)− 1− E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
])2 . (29)
Dividing both numerator and denominator of (29) by coshn
(
a2
σ2w
)
coshn
(
2a2
σ2w
)
, we note that
E
[
U
(n,1)
tA
]
cosh
n
2
(
a2
σ2w
)
cosh
n
2
(
2a2
σ2w
) = ( cosh(a2/σ2w)
cosh(2a2/σ2w)
)n
2 ≤ 1, as cosh(x)
cosh(2x)
≤ 1 for x ∈ R. Also, σ2U(n)
coshn
(
a2
σ2w
)
coshn
(
2a2
σ2w
) =
cosh−n
(
2a2
σ2w
)
. When T (n) = o(en), setting a2 =
c
(S)
P σ
2
w
√
log T (n)√
2n
for a constant c(S)P ∈ (0, 1)
ensures
U
(n,1)
tA
σU(n)
√
T (n)−1
P−→ 0 as n → ∞. Convergence follows from noting that cosh−n
(
2a2
σ2w
)
=
exp
[
−n log cosh
(
2a2
σ2w
)]
≥ exp
[
−2na4
σ4w
]
. When T (n) = Ω(en), convergence is obtained by
setting a2 = c
(L)
P σ
2
w
2
. Therefore, by Lemma 1, setting a2 = σ2w min
{
c
(S)
P
√
log T (n)√
2n
,
c
(L)
P
2
}
ensures
PFA + PMD ≥ 1−  for any  > 0.
Analysis (Bob): Suppose Alice transmits c(Wk). As in the proof of Theorem 1.1, let Bob em-
ploy the ML decoder that suffers an error event Ek→i when the received vector Yb is closer in Eu-
clidean distance to codeword c(Wi), i 6= k. Knowledge of tA ensures reliable decoding by the ap-
plication of Appendix C: Bob’s error probability, averaged over all the codebooks, decays to zero
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as n→∞ for a covert transmission containing M = nγ
(
1− log2
[
1 + exp
(
− σ2w
2σ2b
min
{
c
(S)
P
√
log T (n)√
2n
,
c
(L)
P
2
})])
bits, where γ ∈ (0, 1) is a constant.
However, as in Theorem 1.1, knowledge of tA is unnecessary for Bob if T (n) < 2cTn where cT
is a constant. Again, let’s augment Alice and Bob’s codebook with the origin c(0) = {0, . . . , 0}
(indicating “no transmission”) and have Bob attempt to decode each of the T (n) slots. Denoting
the decoding error probability in slot t by P(b)e (t), we employ the union bound over all slots to
upper-bound the overall decoding error probability:
P(b)e ≤
T (n)∑
t=1
P(b)e (t). (30)
The decoding error probability for one of the T (n) − 1 slots that Alice does not use is the
probability that the received vector is closer to some codeword than the origin c(0):
P(b)e (t) = P
(
∪2Mi=1E0→i
)
≤
2M∑
i=1
P(E0→i), t 6= tA, (31)
where the inequality is the union bound. Since the Euclidean distance between each codeword
and c(0) is
√
na, by [26, Eq. (3.44)]:
P(E0→i) = Q
(√
na
2σb
)
≤ 1
2
exp
(
−na
2
8σ2b
)
, (32)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt and the inequality is because of the upper bound Q(x) ≤ 1
2
e−x
2/2
[27, Eq. (5)]. Substituting (32) into (31) yields:
P(b)e (t) ≤ 2
M−na2 log2 e
8σ2
b , t 6= tA. (33)
To upper-bound the decoding error probability for the slot that Alice uses to transmit, we
combine the bounds in (33) and (51) as follows:
P(b)e (tA) ≤ 2
M−nmin
{
1−log2
[
1+exp
(
− a2
2σ2
b
)]
,
a2 log2 e
8σ2
b
}
. (34)
Combining (30), (33), and (34) yields:
P(b)e ≤ (T (n)− 1)2
M−na2 log2 e
8σ2
b + 2
M−nmin
{
1−log2
[
1+exp
(
− a2
2σ2
b
)]
,
a2 log2 e
8σ2
b
}
. (35)
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If T (n) = o(en), then Alice sets a2 =
c
(S)
P σ
2
w
√
log T (n)√
2n
. Thus, for large enough n, a
2 log2 e
8σ2b
<
1−log2
[
1 + exp
(
− a2
2σ2b
)]
and Bob’s decoding error probability decays to zero if Alice attempts
to transmit M =
γc
(S)
P σ
2
w
√
n log T (n) log2 e
8
√
2σ2b
bits in a randomly selected n-symbol slot tA, where
γ ∈ (0, 1). If T (n) = Ω(en), then, a2 = c
(L)
P σ
2
w
2
, and T (n) < 2cTn where cT =
(1−γ)c(L)P σ2w log2 e
16σ2b
ensures that Bob’s decoding error probability decays to zero if Alice attempts to transmit M =
nγmin
{
1− log2
[
1 + exp
(
− σ2w
4σ2b
)]
,
c
(L)
P σ
2
w log2 e
16σ2b
}
bits in slot tA.
IV. CONVERSE
In this section we show that Alice cannot transmit ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits both reliably and
covertly using one of the T (n) n-symbol slots. Alice attempts to send one of 2M (equally likely)
M -bit messages reliably to Bob using a sequence of n consecutive symbol periods out of nT (n),
where M = ω(
√
n log T (n)), and each message is encoded arbitrarily into n symbols. Unlike
in the previous section, here Willie is oblivious to the locations of the slot boundaries, Alice’s
codebook construction scheme and other properties of her signal. Nevertheless, by dividing his
sequence of nT (n) observations into a set of T (n) non-overlapping subsequences each containing
n symbols, and employing a simple threshold detector on the maximum subsequence power,
Willie can detect Alice if she attempts to transmit ω(
√
n log T (n)) covert bits reliably.
Theorem 2. Suppose Alice’s transmitter is subject to the average power constraint Pmax ∈
(0,∞). If Alice attempts to transmit ω(√n log T (n)) bits using a sequence of n consecutive
symbol periods that are arbitrarily located inside a sequence of nT (n) symbol periods, then, as
n → ∞, either Willie detects her with high probability, or Bob cannot decode with arbitrarily
low probability of error.
Proof: First, consider log T (n) = ω(n). By the standard arguments [23, Ch. 9], the average
power constraint implies that Alice can reliably transmit at most O(n) bits in n channel uses.
Since n is asymptotically smaller than
√
n log T (n), the claim holds trivially. Therefore, we
focus on log T (n) = O(n) for the remainder of the proof.
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Willie divides the sequence Yw of nT (n) observations into a set of T (n) non-overlapping
subsequences {Yw(t)}T (n)t=1 , with each Yw(t) containing n consecutive observations. Denote by
Υt =
∑
Yi∈Yw(t) Y
2
i the observed power in each subsequence and Υmax = maxt∈{1,...,T (n)}Υt.
For a threshold τ , Willie accuses Alice of transmitting if Υmax > τ , setting
τ = σ2w(n+ c
√
n log T (n)), (36)
with constant c > 0 determined next.
Suppose Alice does not transmit. For an arbitrary P∗FA > 0, we show that there exists c > 0
such that the probability of false alarm P(Υmax > τ) ≤ P∗FA as n → ∞. Note that each
Υt = σ
2
wXt where {Xt}, Xt ∼ χ2n, t = 1, . . . , T (n) is a sequence of i.i.d. chi-squared random
variables each with n degrees of freedom. We have:
P[Υmax > τ ] = 1− P
[
Xmax ≤ τ/σ2w
]
= 1−
[
1− P
[
X1 > n+ c
√
n log T (n)
]]T (n)
,
where Xmax = maxt∈{1,...,T}Xt. The Chernoff bound for the tail of a chi-squared distribution
[28, Lemma 2.2] yields:
P[Υmax > τ ] ≤ 1−
[
1− en2 log
(
1+
c log T (n)√
n
)
− c
√
n log T (n)
2
]T (n)
≤ 1−
1− e−
c2 log T (n)
4
(
1+c
√
log T (n)
n
)
T (n)
(37)
= 1−
1− 1
T (n)
c2
4
(
1+c
√
log T (n)
n
)

T (n)
(38)
where (37) is the application of log(1+x) ≤ x(2+x)
2(1+x)
for x ≥ 0 [29, Eq. (3)] and re-arrangement of
terms. By the definition of the asymptotic notation [18, Ch. 3.1], when log T (n) = O(n), there
exist real constant k > 0 and integer n0 > 0 such that log T (n) ≤ kn for all n ≥ n0. Setting
c > 2(
√
k +
√
1 + k) ensures that (38) converges to zero as n → ∞ (when log T (n) = o(n),
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setting c > 2 suffices). Therefore, for any desired upper bound on the false alarm probability,
there exists a constant c such that setting the threshold as in (36) guarantees that upper bound
for n large enough.
Now suppose Alice uses an arbitrary codebook {c(Wk), k = 1, . . . , 2nR} and transmits
codeword c(Wk) using n consecutive symbol periods. Denote the average symbol power of
c(Wk) by Pf =
‖c(Wk)‖2
n
. Since Alice uses n consecutive symbols, her transmission overlaps
at most two of Willie’s subsequences, which we denote tA and tB. Denote by PA and PB the
power from Alice’s transmission in subsequences tA and tB, respectively, with PA +PB = nPf .
Willie’s probability of missing Alice’s transmission is:
P(k)MD = P(Υmax ≤ τ) = P(ΥtA ≤ τ)P(ΥtB ≤ τ)
T (n)∏
t=1
t/∈{tA,tB}
P(Υt ≤ τ), (39)
where the factorization in (39) is because Alice’s codeword and the noise in other subsequences
are independent.
∏T (n)
t=1,t/∈{tA,tB} P(Υt ≤ τ) ≤ 1 does not depend on Alice’s codeword. However,
since the codeword is an unknown deterministic signal that is added to AWGN on Willie’s
channel to Alice, ΥtA
σ2w
∼ χ2n(PA) and ΥtBσ2w ∼ χ
2
n(PB) are non-central chi-squared random variables
with n degrees of freedom and respective non-centrality parameters PA
σ2w
and PB
σ2w
. Without loss of
generality, assume that PA ≥ PB. Thus, PA satisfies nPf2 ≤ PA ≤ nPf and the expected value
and variance of ΥtA are bounded as follows [30, App. D.1]:
E [ΥtA ] ≥ σ2wn+
nPf
2
(40)
Var [ΥtA ] ≤ 2nσ4w + 4nσ2wPf . (41)
Since P(ΥtB ≤ τ) ≤ 1, Chebyshev’s inequality with (40) and (41) yields:
P(k)MD ≤ P
[
|ΥtA − E[ΥtA ]| > E[ΥtA ]− σ2w[n+ c
√
n log T (n)]
]
≤ 2σ
4
w + 4σ
2
wPf(√
nPf
2
− cσ2w
√
log T (n)
)2 .
(42)
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Therefore, if Pf = ω
(√
log T (n)
n
)
, as n → ∞, PFA + PMD can be made arbitrarily small. The
proof of the non-zero lower bound on the decoding error probability P(b)e if Alice tries to transmit
ω(
√
n log T (n)) bits in a single slot using average symbol power Pf = O
(√
log T (n)
n
)
follows
from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 2 in [3], [4].
V. DISCUSSION
Here we relate our work to other studies of covert communication. An overview of the area
can be found in [31].
A. Relationship with Steganography
Steganography is an ancient discipline [32] of hiding messages in innocuous objects. Modern
steganographic systems [33] hide information by altering the properties of fixed-size, finite-
alphabet covertext objects (e.g., images), and are subject to a similar SRL as covert communi-
cation: O(√n) symbols in covertext of size n may safely be modified to hide an O(√n log n)-bit
message in the resulting stegotext [34]. The similarity between the SRLs in these disciplines
comes from the mathematics of statistical hypothesis testing, as discussed in [4]. The extra
log n factor is because of the lack of noise in the steganography context. However, arguably the
earliest work on SRL [35] shows its achievability without the log n factor in the presence of an
“active” adversary that corrupts stegotext using AWGN. This was re-discovered independently
and published with the converse in [3], [4].
Batch steganography uses multiple covertext objects to hide a message and is subject to the
steganographic SRL described above [36], [37]. The batch steganography interpretation of covert
communication using the timing-based degree-of-freedom that is described here is equivalent to
using only one of T (n) covertext objects of size n to embed a message. Willie, who knows that
one covertext object is used but not which one, has to examine all of them. We are not aware
of any work on this particular problem, but it is likely that one could extend our result to it.
We also note that more recent work on steganography shows that an empirical model of the
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covertext suffices to break the steganographic SRL, allowing the embedding of O(n) bits in an
n-symbol covertext [38]. However, this technique relies on embedding messages in covertext by
replacing part of it—something that cannot be done in standard communication systems unless
Alice controls Willie’s noise source.
B. Related Work in Physical Layer Covert Communication
The emergence of radio-frequency (RF) communication systems necessitated the development
of means to protect them from jamming, detection, and eavesdropping. Spread-spectrum tech-
niques [39] address these issues by transmitting a signal that requires bandwidth WM on a much
wider bandwidth Ws  WM, thus, effectively suppressing the power spectral density of the
signal below the noise floor. This provides both covertness as well as the resistance to jamming,
fading, and other interference.
However, while the spread-spectrum architectures are well-developed, the fundamental SRL
for covert communication has been derived only recently [3], [4]. This resulted in the revival
of the field, with follow-on work focusing on reducing the size of the pre-shared secret [5],
[6], fully characterizing the optimal constant hidden by the big-O notation of the SRL [6], [7],
and extending the SRL to quantum channels with Willie limited only by the laws of quantum
mechanics [10]–[12]. Finally, while here we improve on the SRL by exploiting Willie’s ignorance
of transmission timing, other studies explore even stronger assumptions on his limitations. In
particular, authors in [13], [16], [17] examine the impact of the errors in Willie’s estimate of
noise variance σ2w at his receiver, which allows O(n) covert bits to be transmitted in n uses
of the channel even when Willie has upper and lower bounds on σ2w. Thus, positive-rate rather
than SRL-governed covert communication is possible when Willie’s knowledge of the channel
is incomplete. However, successive work has demonstrated that the converse of Section IV still
holds even if Willie does not know σ2w, but under the restrictive assumption that Willie knows
the slot boundaries [40]. The main result of [40] can then be combined with the approach of
Theorem 2 to remove the requirement of Willie knowing the slot boundaries, as described in
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Corollary 2 of [40].
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that secretly pre-arranging a choice of a single n-symbol period slot out of
T (n) allows Alice to reliably transmit O(min{n,√n log T (n)}) bits on an AWGN channel to
Bob while rendering Willie’s detector arbitrarily close to ineffective. Surprisingly, the multi-
plicative increase in transmitted information over the result in [3], [4] is obtained without the
need for Bob to know which slot holds the transmission if T (n) < 2cTn, where cT is a constant,
and, when T (n) ≥ 2cTn only an additive expense of an extra log T (n) pre-shared secret bits is
needed. In the future we plan on combining this work with our recent results on jammer-assisted
covert communication [9] to enable covert networks.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider any  > 0. Suppose Willie chooses threshold τ(n) arbitrarily. The false alarm
probability is lower-bounded using the fact that S(n) is independent of which hypothesis is true:
P[L(n)0 > τ(n)|H0 is true] ≥ P
[
S(n) ≥ τ(n) + δ
∣∣∣|V (n)0 | < δ] .
Similarly the probability of missed detection is lower-bounded as follows:
P[L(n)1 ≤ τ(n)|H1 is true] ≥ P
[
S(n) ≤ τ(n)− δ
∣∣∣|V (n)1 | < δ] .
Denoting by EC(τ(n), δ) the event that either S(n) ≥ τ(n) + δ or S(n) ≤ τ(n)− δ,
P(EC(τ(n), δ)) = 1− FS(n)(τ(n) + δ) + FS(n)(τ(n)− δ),
where FS(n)(·) is the distribution function for S(n). Denote the standard Gaussian distribution
function by Φ(z) =
∫ z
−∞ φ(t)dt where φ(t) =
e−t
2/2√
2pi
is the standard Gaussian density function.
The convergence of FS(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise in z, and, since τ(n) is the nth value in an
arbitrary sequence, we cannot use this fact directly. However, let’s choose finite constants G < 0
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and H > 0, and partition the real number line into three regions as shown in Figure 3. Clearly,
for any n, τ(n) is in one of these regions. Next we demonstrate that (47) holds for an arbitrary
τ(n) by appropriately selecting G, H , and δ.
-ff . . .. . .
0
← Region 1 Region 3 →Region 2
G HG−δ G+δ H−δ H+δ
τ(n)+δτ(n)τ(n)−δ
xk xk + 3δ
Fig. 3: The real number line partitioned into three regions for the analysis of P(EC(τ(n), δ)).
G, H and δ are the constants that we select. τ(n) satisfying G ≤ τ(n) ≤ H is illustrated.
Consider τ(n) < G, or region 1 in Figure 3: P(EC(τ(n), δ)) ≥ 1 − FS(n)(τ(n) + δ) ≥
1 − FS(n)(G + δ). Because the convergence of FS(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise, given δ, , and
G = Φ−1(/6)−δ, there exists n2 such that, for all n ≥ n2, P(EC(τ(n), δ)) ≥ 1−Φ(G+δ)− 6 =
1 − 
3
when τ(n) < G. Similarly for τ(n) > H , or region 3 in Figure 3: P(EC(τ(n), δ)) ≥
FS(n)(τ(n)−δ) ≥ FS(n)(H+δ). Again, because the convergence of FS(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise,
given δ, , and H = Φ−1(1− /6) + δ, there exists n3 such that, for τ(n) > H and all n ≥ n3,
P(EC(τ(n), δ)) ≥ Φ(H + δ)− 
3
= 1− 
3
. (43)
Finally, consider τ(n) satisfying G ≤ τ(n) ≤ H , or region 2 in Figure 3. Let’s assume that H
and G are selected so that H−G is an integer multiple of δ (e.g., using larger H than necessary,
which results in the lower bound in (43) being smaller). Consider a sequence {xk}(H−G)/δ+2k=0
where x0 = G− δ, x1 = G, x2 = G+ δ, x3 = G+ 2δ, . . . , x(H−G)/δ = H − δ, x(H−G)/δ+1 = H ,
x(H−G)/δ+2 = H + δ. Sequence {xk}(H−G)/δ+2k=0 partitions region 2 into H−Gδ + 2 subregions,
and, for any τ(n) satisfying G ≤ τ(n) ≤ H , there exists k ∈ {0, . . . , H−G
δ
+ 2
}
such that
xk ≤ τ(n)− δ < τ(n) + δ ≤ xk + 3δ, as illustrated in Figure 3. Since FS(n)(z) is monotonic,
P(EC(τ(n), δ)) ≥ 1− FS(n)(xk + 3δ) + FZ(n)(xk). (44)
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Since the convergence of FS(n)(z) to Φ(z) is pointwise, for a given xk, δ, and , there exists
mk such that for all n ≥ mk,
P(EC(τ(n), δ)) ≥ 1−
(
Φ(xk + 3δ) +

12
)
+
(
Φ(xk)− 
12
)
= 1−
∫ xk+3δ
xk
φ(t)dt− 
6
(45)
≥ 1− 3δ√
2pi
− 
6
(46)
where (46) follows from φ(t) ≤ 1√
2pi
. Setting δ = 
√
2pi
18
and n4 = max{0,...,H−Gδ }(mk) yields the
desired lower bound for all n ≥ n4 when τ(n) satisfies G ≤ τ(n) ≤ H . Thus, for any τ(n),
when n ≥ n0 where n0 = max(n2, n3, n4),
P
(
EC
(
τ(n), 
√
2pi/18
))
≥ 1− 
3
. (47)
Since V (n)0
P−→ 0 and V (n)1 P−→ 0, there exists n1 > 0 such that for all n ≥ n1, P
(
|V (n)0 | > 
√
2pi
18
)
<

3
and P
(
|V (n)0 | > 
√
2pi
18
)
< 
3
. The intersection of these events and the event EC(S(n), 
√
2pi/9)
yields a detection error event. By combining their probabilities using DeMorgan’s Law and the
union bound, we lower-bound PFA + PMD ≥ 1−  for all n ≥ max{n0, n1}.
Remark: Lemma 1 holds when S(n) converges to any distribution provided it has a continuous
density, however, here we do not need such generality.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF EQUALITY 1
2n
∑
x∈{−1,1}n exp [a
∑n
i=1 xi] = cosh
n(a)
We argue by induction on n. The base case n = 1 is trivial. Assume the claim holds for n.
Now,
1
2n+1
∑
x∈{−1,1}n+1
exp
[
a
n+1∑
i=1
xi
]
=
1
2 · 2n
∑
x∈{−1,1}n
xn+1∈{−1,1}
exp[axn+1] exp
[
a
n∑
i=1
xi
]
= cosh(a) coshn(a).
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APPENDIX C
ANALYSIS OF P(b)e UNDER PEAK POWER CONSTRAINT AND KNOWN tA
Here we analyze Bob’s decoding error probability P(b)e when the transmission time tA is
known and Alice uses binary modulation {−a, a} that satisfies the peak power constraint and
ensures that PFA +PMD ≥ 1− . This appendix provides an alternative to the analysis of P(b)e in
the proof of Theorem 1.2 in [3], [4] (the analysis of P(b)e in the proof of Theorem 1.2 in [3], [4]
contains minor technical errors which do not change the main results). The construct presented
here is adapted for the proof of Theorem 1.2 in Section III.
Suppose Alice transmits c(Wk). Recall that c(Wk) is drawn from a codebook {c(Wm),m =
1, 2, . . . , 2M} containing codewords that are independently generated according to pX(x) =∏n
i=1 pX(xi), where pX(−a) = pX(a) = 12 . Bob uses an ML decoder which suffers an error
event Ek→i when the received vector Yb is closer in Euclidean distance to codeword c(Wi),
i 6= k. The decoding error probability, averaged over all the codebooks, is then:
P(b)e = Ec(Wk)
[
P
(
∪2Mi=0
i6=k
Ek→i
)]
≤
2M∑
i=1
i 6=k
Ec(Wk)P(Ek→i), (48)
where EX [·] denotes the expectation over random variable X , and the inequality in (48) is the
union bound. Let ‖d‖2 = ‖c(Wk) − c(Wi)‖2 denote the Euclidean (L2) distance between two
codewords. Then, by [26, Eq. (3.44)]:
Ec(Wk)P(Ek→i) = Ed
[
Q
(‖d‖2
2σb
)]
≤ Ed
[
1
2
exp
(
−‖d‖
2
2
8σ2b
)]
, (49)
where Q(x) = 1√
2pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2/2dt and the bound in (49) is because Q(x) ≤ 1
2
e−x
2/2 [27, Eq. (5)].
The Euclidean distance ‖d‖2 depends on the number of locations j where c(Wk) and c(Wi)
differ, which is binomially-distributed by construction, where each location is different with
probability 1
2
. When the codewords are different in j locations, we have ‖d‖22 = 4ja2, and thus:
Ed
[
1
2
exp
(
−‖d‖
2
2
8σ2b
)]
=
1
2
n∑
j=0
exp
(
− ja
2
2σ2b
)(
n
j
)
1
2n
=
1
2n+1
[
1 + exp
(
− a
2
2σ2b
)]n
, (50)
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where (50) is an application of binomial theorem. Substitution of (50) into (48) yields
P(b)e ≤ 2
M−n
(
1−log2
[
1+exp
(
− a2
2σ2
b
)])
. (51)
Thus, if Alice attempts to transmit M = nγ
(
1− log2
[
1 + exp
(
− a2
2σ2b
)])
bits, where γ ∈ (0, 1)
is a constant, Bob’s decoding error probability decays to zero as n → ∞. If a2 = O(1), then
clearly M = O(n) bits. If a2 = o(1), then, application of the bounds log2(1 + x) ≤ xln 2 and
1− e−x ≥ x− x2
2
yields M = O(na2). In particular, if σ2w is known to Alice and a2 = 2
√
2σ2w√
n
as prescribed by the analysis of Willie’s detector in [4, Theorem 1.2], M = O(σ2w
√
n/σ2b).
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